Bounded Rationality of \u3cem\u3eHomo Classificus\u3c/em\u3e: The Law and Bioeconomics of Social Norms as Classification by Landa, Janet T.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 80 
Issue 3 Symposium: Must We Choose Between 
Rationality and Irrationality? 
Article 7 
June 2005 
Bounded Rationality of Homo Classificus: The Law and 
Bioeconomics of Social Norms as Classification 
Janet T. Landa 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Janet T. Landa, Bounded Rationality of Homo Classificus: The Law and Bioeconomics of Social Norms as 
Classification, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1167 (2005). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol80/iss3/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
BOUNDED RATIONALITY OF HOMO CLASSIFICUS: THE LAW AND
BIOECONOMICS OF SOCIAL NORMS AS CLASSIFICATION
JANET T. LANDA*
INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s, law and economics scholars such as Robert Ellickson,
Lisa Bernstein, Cass Sunstein, Richard McAdams, and Eric Posner, among
others, focused their attention on the analysis of social norms as an altema-
tive to law in regulating social behavior.1 This led Lawrence Lessig to
name the 1990s law and norms literature as the "New Chicago School"
("NCS") and Ellickson as its founder.2 But the origin of the new law and
economics literature on social norms dates back to the early 1980s, when I
published a series of three papers on social norms embedded in the "ethni-
cally homogeneous middleman group" ("EHMG"). 3 These norms serve as
an alternative to contract law for the enforcement of contracts under condi-
tions of contract uncertainty where the legal framework is not well devel-
oped.4 In addition, I published a paper on primitive contract law that
focused on the Kula Ring, a gift-exchange system operating in the stateless
societies in Papua New Guinea, which functioned to facilitate intertribal
regional trade. 5
* Professor of Economics, Department of Economics, York University, 4700 Keele Street,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada M3J 1 P3. jlanda@yorku.ca.
1. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW; How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES
(1991); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Dia-
mond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96
COLUM. L. REv. 903 (1996); Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997); ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000) [hereinafter
POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS]; Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics
and the Law, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 765 (1998) [hereinafter Posner, Signs, Symbols, and Social Norms].
2. Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998).
3. See MeAdams' survey of the origins and development of the law and economics literature on
social norms, supra note 1, at 343-50, including my 1980s papers, at 343 n.21.
4. See Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institu-
tional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349 (1981); Jack Car & Janet T. Landa, The
Economics of Symbols. Clan Names and Religion, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1983); Robert Cooter &
Janet T. Landa, Personal Versus Impersonal Trade: The Size of Trading Groups and Contract Law, 4
INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 15 (1984).
5. Janet T. Landa, The Enigma of the Kula Ring: Gift-Exchanges and Primitive Law and Order,
3 INT'L REV. LAW & ECON. 137 (1983).
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Two features characterized the 1990s NCS social norms literature: (1)
the emphasis on enforcement of norm-based rules (thus differentiating the
NCS from the old Chicago school legal centralism tradition); 6 and (2) the
development of a signaling theory of social norms associated with the work
of Eric Posner.7 In Posner' s signaling theory of norms, he argues that indi-
viduals conform to norms in order to signal that they are reliable partners,
thus facilitating the identification of cooperative partners. As the content of
my early 1980s work on social norms embedded in the EHMG embody the
above two features, my early work clearly falls within the NCS tradition.
Since the 1980s, I have extended my law and economic analysis of social
norms by incorporating insights from cognitive anthropology, evolutionary
psychology, evolutionary biology, and bioeconomics. The expanded theory
of social norms explicitly incorporates the cognitive foundations of social
norms-as-classification, and economic man as the boundedly rational Homo
classificus. An expanded theory of social norms throws new light on mi-
nority middleman success in various parts of the world, and on such press-
ing social problems as racial discrimination, racial profiling, ethnic
conflict, and international terrorism.
The paper is organized as follows. In Part I, I discuss my early 1980s
work on social norms and place the work squarely within the NCS tradi-
tion. I also discussed the cognitive foundations of social norms-as-
classification in my 1981 theory of the EHMG, in which I incorporated key
concepts in sociology and anthropology. In Part II, I discuss how I explic-
itly incorporated anthropologist Mary Douglas' cognitive approach to insti-
tutions in my expanded theory of social norms-as-classification. My social
norms-as-classification approach links up with evolutionary psychology's
view that people resort to classification as a fast-and-frugal heuristic under
conditions of limited information. In Part III, I discuss the origins and func-
tions of social norms when viewed from a evolutionary biology and bio-
economics perspective. In Part IV, I discuss my law and bioeconomics of
Homogeneous Middleman Groups ("HMGs") functioning as "adaptive
units" viewed from a multilevel evolutionary perspective. By providing
evidence of HMGs functioning as adaptive units that outcompete other
ethnic groups, I provided a very rare and important empirical example of a
real world phenomenon that supports the controversial "group selection
6. See McAdams, supra note 1, at 343-50. The analysis of norms is not confined within law and
economics. Economists such as Alexander Field have also analyzed norms from a microeconomics
perspective. See Alexander J. Field, Microeconomics, Norms, and Rationality, 32 ECON. DEV. &
CULTURAL CHANGE 683 (1984).
7. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS, supra note 1; Posner, Signs, Symbols, and Social Norms,
supra note 1.
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theory" in the field of evolutionary biology. I conclude, in Part V, with a
brief discussion of the implications of an expanded theory of social norms-
as-classification and the bounded rationality of Homo classificus.
1. THE EARLY 1980s LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
SOCIAL NORMS LITERATURE
A. Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group as a Club-
like Institution for Contract Enforcement
Neoclassical economics of exchange-the Edgeworth and Walrasian
exchange paradigm-assumes atomistic individuals engaging in costless
exchange on an impersonal basis. In such a zero transaction costs world of
exchange, institutions of actual capitalist market economies such as money,
merchants, and contract law play no role. Ronald Coase, the founder of law
and economics, characterized such zero transaction cost theoretical models
as "Blackboard economics. '"' Over twenty-five years ago, based on my
fieldwork on the Hokkien-Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia, I found
that: (1) the marketing of smallholders' rubber was dominated by a close-
knit EHMG, with five clans (Tan, Lee, Lim, Ng, and Gan) from Chuan-
chow and Yung-chun counties in Fukkien province; and (2) Hokkien-
Chinese traders self-consciously chose their trading partners on a kin-
ship/ethnic or other particularistic basis because of the importance of iden-
tity under conditions of contract uncertainty, in which choice of trustworthy
trading partners became very important. 9 The empirical phenomenon of the
EHMG, with its network of personalized exchange, contradicts Neoclassi-
cal theory of impersonal exchange. Thus, I developed my theory of the
EHMG/ethnic trading networks in which "identity matters," and "identity
matters" became the central concept underlying my early 1980s publica-
8. In his Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture, Coase talks about the nature of "blackboard economics":
The concentration on the determination of prices has led to a narrowing of focus which has
had as a result the neglect of other aspects of the economic system.... This neglect of other
aspects of the system has been made easier by another feature of modem economic theory-
the growing abstraction of the analysis, which does not seem to call for a detailed knowledge
of the actual economic system or, at any rate, has managed to proceed without it.... What is
studied is a system which lives in the minds of economists but not on earth. I have called the
result "blackboard economics."
R.H. COASE, THE INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION: THE 1991 ALFRED NOBEL MEMORIAL
PRIZE LECTURE tN ECONOMIC SCIENCES 2-4 (1991).
9. Janet T. Landa, The Economics of the Ethnically Homogeneous Chinese Middleman Group: A
Property Rights-Public Choice Approach ch. 3 (1978) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Virginia Poly-
technic Institute and State University) (on file with Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University;
also on file with the University Microfilms International, Dissertation Copies, Ann Arbor, Michigan,
Vol. XXXIX, No. 9, 1978)).
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tions,1 0 leading to the emergence of a new area of economics called the
"Economics of Identity."' 1
In these papers, I explained Chinese middleman success by develop-
ing a theory of the Chinese EHMG/ethnic trading network as a club-like
arrangement in which Hokkien-Chinese traders cooperated with each other
by providing themselves with club goods such as contract enforcement,
capital/credit, and information in response to an environment lacking basic
infrastructure (legal infrastructure, banking, and credit-rating institutions).
Group enforcement of Confucian ethics of reciprocity (mutual aid) facili-
tated cooperation, enabling the members of the EHMG to outcompete other
ethnic groups and appropriate the role of middleman-entrepreneur.12
Of the various club goods provided by members of the EHMG, the
most important was contract enforcement via community enforcement of
informal social norms (Confucian norms of reciprocity). I argued that under
conditions of contract uncertainty, where the legal infrastructure for con-
tract enforcement is not well-developed, a rational Chinese merchant will
not randomly enter into transactions with anonymous traders. Instead, he
will choose to trade with trading partners whom he can trust, thus personal-
izing exchange relations on the basis of kinship or ethnic ties. This is be-
cause embedded in these personalistic or particularistic exchange relations
are shared social norms of behavior (Confucian ethics of reciprocity),
which function to constrain traders from breach of contract; any trader who
violates the ethics of the group will be punished and possibly ostracized
from the group. Because the Chinese marketing network consists of a chain
of interconnected middlemen links, the aggregate effect of traders' dis-
criminatory choice of trading partners is the emergence of a self-organizing
complex network of personalized exchanges, or an EHMG. The EHMG is a
club-like arrangement that serves as an alternative to contract law and the
vertically integrated firm for achieving cooperation and coordination of
interdependent traders, hence economizing on contract enforcement costs
in an environment characterized by contract uncertainty. The Confucian
code of ethics thus serves as an extralegal institutional arrangement for the
enforcement of contracts. 13
10. See Landa, supra note 4; Carr & Landa, supra note 4; Cooter & Landa, supra note 4.
11. See JANET T. LANDA, TRUST, ETHNICITY, AND IDENTITY: BEYOND THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS OF ETHNIC TRADING NETWORKS, CONTRACT LAW, AND GIFT-EXCHANGE (1994). Re-
cently, George Akerlof & Rachel Kranton contributed a paper in this new field. See George A. Akerlof
& Rachel E. Kranton, Economics and Identity, 115 Q.J. ECON. 715 (2000).
12. Janet T. Landa, The Law and Bioeconomics of Ethnic Cooperation and Conflict in Plural
Societies of Southeast Asia: A Theory of Chinese Merchant Success, 1 J. BIOECONOMICS 269 (1999);
Landa, supra note 9.
13. See Landa, supra note 4; Landa, supra note 9, ch. 5.
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A theory very similar to my theory of the EHMG as an informal insti-
tutional arrangement for the enforcement of contracts has been developed
by Avner Greif regarding the homogenous group of Maghribi-Jewish trad-
ing group in medieval Europe. Greif's theory, however, takes into account
only reputational effects and punishments that constrained traders from
breach and does not consider the role of social norms as constraints on
breach, which is central to my theory of the EHMG. 14 Greif's theory also
does not include a theory of the emergence or formation of the Maghribi
trading group.
B. Signaling Theory of Social Norms: Customs, Rituals, and Other Sym-
bols of Individual and Group Identity
Jack Carr & I extended my theory of the EHMG to other homogene-
ous middleman groups ("HMGs"), including religious trading groups such
as Jewish merchants in medieval Europe. We developed a formal club-
theoretic model depicting the optimal size of homogenous trading clubs by
analyzing the economic benefits (lowered breach costs) and costs (en-
forcement and information costs) of belonging to a homogenous trading
club. We argued that the economic benefits outweighted the costs for a club
member. We also explained how many seemingly strange rituals and cus-
toms of trading groups such as Jewish dietary laws, Jews lending to fellow
Jews at zero interest, Chinese keeping of genealogical records, distinctive
dress style, etc., were rational trading practices. First, we used signaling
theory to argue that these rituals, customs, and other symbols of religious
or group identity-such as clan names, dietary rules, language, dress, and
religion-play an important signaling function in transmitting nonprice
information about the identity of potential partners, thus economizing on
information costs of identifying trustworthy or cooperative potential part-
ners. Second, we argued that these symbols and rituals of group identity
screen out outsiders by erecting barriers to entry for those outsiders who
may wish to "free ride" on the benefits of club membership. We analyzed
these two functions of customs, rituals, and other symbols of group identity
by examining, as an example, Jewish dietary laws. Jews have a stringent set
of dietary laws known as the kashruth. Why do members of these religious
organizations restrict their eating behavior when there seem to be no appar-
ent benefits from doing so? 15 We argued that there are benefits:
14. See Avner Greif, Contract Enforceability and Economic Institutions in Early Trade: The
Maghribi Traders' Coalition, 83 AM. ECON. REv. 525 (1993); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions
in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. EcON. HIST. 857 (1989).
15. Carr& Landa, supra note 4, at 153-54.
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Dietary laws give religious members a feeling of shared values. These
shared values give members of the religious organizations a sense of a
common identity and distinguish them from nonmembers. It is exactly
this difference between members and nonmembers that is needed to fa-
cilitate economic exchange under conditions of contract uncertainty....
Dietary laws also help identify club members, an especially important
function if club members are geographically dispersed. Dietary laws dis-
courage conversion by increasing the costs of joining the organization
and thus serve as a barrier against those seeking to become members in
order to receive the economic benefits.
16
Shared symbols of identity lower the costs of identifying an individual,
thus promoting in-group cooperation and social solidarity, as well as erect-
ing barriers to entry for outsiders.
Of the various methods outsiders can employ to "free ride"/pass or
mimic insiders-changing dress, changing surname, learning a new lan-
guage, converting to a new religion, or changing ethnic identity-ethnic
identity imposes the highest barrier to entry for an outsider belonging to a
different ethnic group. 17 Ethnic identity is like a peacock's elaborate tail: it
is very costly for an outsider from a different ethnic group to fake/pass as
an insider. 18 In this context, ethnicity serves as a costly signal for an out-
sider who wishes to pass as an insider. In addition, cultural transmission of
Confucian social norms-via learning from parents, teachers, and peers--
to the next generation of merchants, explains why the ethnic boundary of
the Chinese middleman group persists over time. 19
Outside the law and economics literature, Lawrence lannaccone pub-
lished a paper on religious groups which is very similar to the Carr-Landa
1983 paper. He explains that rational church members may benefit from
bizarre behavioral restrictions, such as dietary restrictions or painful initia-
tions, because such restrictions can overcome free rider problems associ-
ated with collective action.
20
Robert Cooter & I further extended my theory of the EHMG by de-
veloping a formal mathematical model depicting the relationship between
the size of trading groups and the development of the law of contracts. 2
1
We think of a trading group as an informal club-like arrangement for re-
16. Id. at 154-
17. Janet T. Landa, Culture and Entrepreneurship in Less-Developed Countries: Ethnic Trading
Networks as Economic Organizations, in THE CULTURE OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 53 (Brigitte Berger ed.,
1991).
18. Janet T. Landa, Bioeconomics of Some Nonhuman and Human Societies. New Institutional
Economics Approach, I J. BIOECONOMICS 95, 108 (1999).
19. See Landa, supra note 17, at 69-70.
20. Laurence R. lannaccone, Sacrifice and Stigma: Reducing Free-riding in Cults, Communes,
and Other Collectives, 100 J. POL. ECON. 272 (1992).
21 . Cooter & Landa, supra note 4, at 16-21.
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ducing breach of contract between members. If the group expands, then
members gain the advantage of a more extensive internal market. On the
other hand, as the group expands, personal relations become attenuated. For
a given level of expenditure by the group on enforcement, the probability
of breach will increase as the group becomes larger. We proved that mem-
bership in clubs will decline if contracts with outsiders become more se-
cure. Taken together, the above three papers by myself and my coauthors in
the early 1980s clearly fall within the NCS tradition.
C. The Kula Ring Gift Exchange in Stateless Societies:
Primitive Contract Law
The Kula Ring is a classic example in the anthropological literature of
ceremonial gift-exchanges that exist in non-Western "stateless" tribal so-
cieties. 22 It is a gift-exchange system carried on by different East Papuo-
Melanesian tribal communities located in a ring of islands, hence the ring
structure of the Kula. Twice each year, "Big-Men" of the various tribes
lead large canoe expeditions to visit their Kula partners. Strict rules govern
Kula exchange. The gifts exchanged must be two different kinds of valu-
ables of equivalent value and travel in opposite directions in the Kula. A
necklace must be given to a Kula partner located in a clockwise direction
from the giver. At a future date, the recipient of a necklace must reciprocate
with a countergift of an armshell to his Kula partner located in the counter-
clockwise direction. Thus, the Kula is a delayed, reciprocal gift-exchange
system: while the gift is given voluntarily by the original giver, the recipi-
ent who accepts the gift is obligated to reciprocate with a countergift at a
future date. In order to become a member of the Kula Ring, a person must
inherit a Kula object or magic from his father or mother's brother.
Anthropologist Marcel Mauss and political scientist Singh Uberoi
have interpreted the Kula gift-exchange as an institutional arrangement in
which tribal leaders in stateless societies create political alliances among
the different tribes so that Kula partners can come to one another's islands
to engage in peaceful commercial barter trade.2 3 I have interpreted the ring
structure of Kula exchange as an efficient way these tribal communities can
enforce the rules of the Kula game. 24 I argued that the mechanism for con-
22. BROWNISLAW MALINOWKSI, ARGONAUTS OF THE WESTERN PACIFIC: AN ACCOUNT OF
NATIVE ENTERPRISE AND ADVENTURE IN THE ARCHIPELAGOES OF MELANESIAN NEW GUINEA (1922).
23. See MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCIIAIC
SOCIETIES 25 (Ian Cunnison trans., 1954); J.P. SINGH UBEROI, POLITICS OF THE KULA RING: AN
ANALYSIS OF THE FINDINGS OF BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI (1971).
24. See Landa, supra note 5.
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tract enforcement is built into the ring structure of Kula exchange: if any
Kula partner holds on to the valuables for too long, then all other partners
can identify the offending party because every Kula partner is directly and
indirectly connected together in a circular trade network. Kula partners can
impose social sanctions on the deviant Kula partner by forming a grand
coalition to bypass the offending party, thus excluding him from barter
trade. Kula gift-exchange is a classic example of a private ordering or ex-
tralegal arrangement for enforcing primitive contractual obligations across
tribal boundaries in stateless societies.
Like names or dietary rituals, which transmit low cost information to
potential trading partners belonging to the same ethnic group, gifts also
perform a signaling function. In the Kula Ring, two different ceremonial
gifts circulate in opposite directions perpetually around the ring of traders.
It is by the use of two different kinds of gifts that the parties signal to each
other their mutual intentions of entering into friendly political alliances;
receiving gifts alone is not enough. In addition, I interpret customary prac-
tices associated with the Kula trade such as the use of totemic clan names,
magical rites, and mortuary rituals as ways in which Kula traders econo-
mize on the costs of identifying members of the Kula Ring club, and at the
same time erect barriers to entry against outsiders.
II. COGNITIVE FOUNDATIONS OF INSTITUTIONS
A. Mary Douglas' Cognitive Theory of Institutions
Rules of the game or institutions are important concepts in the new in-
stitutional economics, which includes law and economics. 25 Institutions,
according to Douglass North, are the rules of the game in a society: "Insti-
tutions include any form of constraint that human beings devise to shape
human interaction.... Institutional constraints include both what individu-
als are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions some
individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities. '26 North's defini-
tion of institutions includes both formal and informal institutions. Contract
law is an example of a formal institution; conventions, customs, codes of
conduct, ethics, and religion are examples of informal institutions.
Anthropologist Mary Douglas takes a very different view of the role
of institutions. She criticizes the rational choice approach to institutions for
25- See LANDA, supra note 11, ch. 1.
26. DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3-4 (1990),
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relying heavily on individualist foundations ("methodological individual-
ism"), and she argues that as a result rational choice theorists have great
difficulty with the idea of group solidarity. 27 She supplements the weakness
of the "unsociological" rational choice approach to institutions with a cog-
nitive and classificatory theory of institutions that bridges the concept of
the individual and the society. Douglas argues that in order for cooperation
to occur, institutions need to be grounded by a cognitive device in order for
individuals to be certain about one another's strategies, thus generating the
necessary trust in one another's behavior.28 For human discourse and coop-
eration to be possible, individuals have to agree on basic categories of
thought, and that is provided by institutions that "define sameness," "confer
identity," and "do the classifying. '29 For Douglas, classification is a fun-
damental cognitive process based on institutions that define standard ex-
pectations of society. Institutions do the classifying for individuals by
providing "labels": "People have always been labeling each other, with the
same consequences-labels stick."' 30 "Persons realize their own identities
and classify each other through community affiliation." 31 Douglas' cogni-
tive approach to institutions can be linked with anthropologist Fredrik
Barth's important concept of an ethnic boundary:
[T]he ethnic boundary canalizes social life-it entails a frequently quite
complex organization of behaviour and social relations. The identifica-
tion of another person as a fellow member of an ethnic group implies a
sharing of criteria for evaluation and judgement. It thus entails the as-
sumption that the two are fundamentally "playing the same game"....
On the other hand, a dichotomization of others as strangers, as members
of another ethnic group, implies a recognition of limitations of shared
understandings, differences in criteria for judgement of value and per-
formance, and a restriction of interaction to sectors of assumed common
understanding and mutual interest. 32
B. Confucian Ethics of Reciprocity:
Cognitive Map of a Hokkien-Chinese Merchant
From my fieldwork on Hokkien-Chinese merchants, I found that the
Hokkien-Chinese merchants make a basic distinction between "us" (Hok-
kien-Chinese) and "them" (the outsiders: non-Hokkien-Chinese and non-
27 MARY DOUGLAS, HOW INSTITUTIONS THINK (1986).
28. Id- at 55.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 100.
31. Id. at 102.
32. Fredrik Barth, Introduction, in ETHNIC GROUPS AND BOUNDARIES: THE SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION OF CULTURE DIFFERENCE 15 (Fredrik Barth ed., 1969).
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Chinese). In addition, they make further distinctions based on the degree of
"social distance" 33 of members within the Chinese ethnic boundary. Hok-
kien Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia carry a mental map of seven
categories of people with varying degrees of social distance and hence
varying degrees of trustworthiness as potential trading partners.
What determines the seven categories of people? Confucian ethics of
reciprocity provide traders with the framework for classification. Confucian
norms prescribe mutual aid obligations and reciprocity for members of the
same Chinese dialect/ethnic group and do not extend mutual cooperation
and reciprocity to outsiders (see categories six & seven below). Within the
Hokkien-Chinese ethnic group, Confucian ethics further prescribe different
degrees of mutual cooperation and reciprocity among the different catego-
ries of people based on degree of kinship or ethnic distance. Hence the first
five categories below represent the "insiders" (trustworthy trading part-
ners), while categories six and seven represent the "outsiders":
1. Near kinsmen from family
2. Distant kinsmen from extended family
3. Clansmen
4. Fellow villagers from China
5. Fellow Hokkien-Chinese
6. Other Chinese (Teochew, Cantonese, Hakka)
7. Other Ethnic Groups (European, Indians, Malays)
Classification of potential trading partners into seven categories based
on the degree of social distance allows a Chinese merchant to infer the
degree of trustworthiness of potential trading partners from signals or sym-
bols of identity, thus economizing on information costs under conditions
where information is scarce and costly to acquire.
Armed with this subjective "calculus of relations," a term coined by
anthropologist Myer Fortes, 34 it is very easy for a Hokkien-Chinese mer-
chant to identity a potential trading partner-by asking his name or where
he comes from, by listening to his dialect, or by looking at his physical
appearance-in order to place him in the correct category. Once the poten-
tial trader is properly identified and classified, the rational trader will then
proceed with his actual choice of his trading partner. 35
33. For the concept of "social distance," see Marshall D. Sahlins, On the Sociology of Primitive
Exchange, in THE RELEVANCE OF MODELS FOR SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGY 139 (Michael Banton ed.,
1965).
34. MYER FORTES, KINSHIP AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: THE LEGACY OF LEWIS HENRY MORGAN
(1969).
35. Landa, supra note 4, at 359.
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My 1981 theory of the EHMG did not explicitly recognize the cogni-
tive foundations of social norms as classification until I read Douglas' work
on institutions. Perhaps my use of sociologist Marshall Sahlins' concept of
"social distance" and anthropologist Myer Fortes' concept of the "calculus
of relations" can be thought of as equivalent concepts to Douglas' concept
of "institutions doing the classification." After reading Douglas' work, I
expanded my theory of the EHMG by putting my theory firmly on cogni-
tive-classificatory foundations. 36 "Homo economicus" became "Homo clas-
sificus," a term I coined to describe a boundedly rational economic agent
who sorts and classifies other people into relationship categories for the
purpose of economizing on information costs. My expanded theory of so-
cial norms-as-classification establishes links with the "fast-and-frugal heu-
ristics" developed by evolutionary psychologists Gerd Gigerenzer, Peter
Todd, and the ABC Research Group. 37 Classification is one method that
serves as a fast-and-frugal heuristic that economizes on scarce and costly
information. Other fast-and-frugal heuristics, including recognition heuris-
tics (such as name recognition, kin recognition, etc.), also economize on
scarce and costly information.
By ignoring the concept of institutions-as-classification, with its re-
lated concepts of individual and group identity, economists as well as legal
scholars have neglected to incorporate the cognitive-classificatory founda-
tions of institutions, thus ignoring how people think of themselves and
others in terms of categories of people.
III. THE BIOLOGY AND BIOECONOMICS OF MORAL SYSTEMS: IN-GROUP
COOPERATION AND BETWEEN GROUP COMPETITION
So far, we have treated the existence and functions of social norms
without asking about the origin of moral systems or social norms. Biologist
Richard Alexander has provided a biological theory of the origins of moral
systems: 38
Moral systems are societies with rules. Rules are agreements or un-
derstandings about what is permitted and what is not, about what rewards
and punishments are likely for specific acts, about what is right and
wrong. Although moral rules are somewhat different from legal rules, or
laws, the two are not unrelated and frequently overlap....
36. Janet T. Landa, Cognitive and Classificatory Foundations of Trust and Informal Institutions:
A New and Expanded Theory of Ethnic Trading Networks, in RISKY TRANSACTIONS: TRUST, KINSHIP,
AND ETHNICITY 129, 130 (Frank K. Salter ed., 2002).
37. GERD GIGERENZER, PETER M. TODD & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE HEURISTICS
THAT MAKE US SMART (1999).
38. RICHARD D. ALEXANDER, THE BIOLOGY OF MORAL SYSTEMS 1 (1987).
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I will argue that the concepts of moral and ethical arise because of
conflicts of interest, and that-at least up to now-moral systems have
been designed to assist group members and explicitly not to assist the
members of other competing groups.
39
He argues that intergroup competition promotes in-group cooperation
via the role of moral systems. "Humans alone play competitively group
against-group on a large and complex scale."'40 Jack Hirshleifer, a founder
of bioeconomics, also emphasized the importance of social norms and
sanctions in facilitating in-group cooperation as a means of outcompeting
other groups:
[O]n all levels of life organisms have found it profitable to come together
in patterns of cooperative association. But such cooperation is always
secondary and contingent, in at least two respects: (1) in-group coopera-
tion is only a means for more effectively and ruthlessly competing
against outsiders, and (2) even within the group there will not be perfect
parallelism of interests, hence cooperation must generally be supported
by sanctions.... Efficiency, in this interpretation is meaningful only as a
measure of group strength or advantage relative to competing groups in
the struggle for life and resources .... A totally universalistic measure of
efficiency is pointless; we must draw the lines somewhere, at the bound-
ary of"us" and "them."
41
IV. THE BIOECONOMICS OF HOMOGENEOUS MERCHANT GROUPS AS
"ADAPTIVE UNITS": A MULTILEVEL EVOLUTIONARY PERSPECTIVE
Unlike law and economics scholars who emphasize the role of social
norms as constraints, both Alexander and Hirshleifer emphasize the impor-
tance of social norms in promoting in-group cooperation so as to outcom-
pete other groups. Are there real world examples of groups who through
cooperation among in-group members outcompete other groups? The an-
swer is: yes. I have provided a number of case studies of successful mer-
chant groups operating in various underdeveloped countries that lack basic
infrastructure: Chinese merchants in Southeast Asia; Chinese merchants in
People's Republic of China; the Jains-Marawari traders of India; the
Hindu-Gujarat-Indian merchants in Central Africa; the Muslim-Indian trad-
ers in South Africa; the Lebanese traders in West Africa; and the Jewish
merchants in medieval Europe and in present day Jerba, Tunisia, and Ant-
werp. 42 Although these merchant groups originate in societies with very
39. Id. (my emphasis).
40. Id. at 79.
41. Jack Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Models in Economics and Law: Cooperation Versus Conflict
Strategies, 4 RESEARCH LAW & ECON. 1, 50 (1982).
42. Janet T. Landa, The Bioeconomics of Homogeneous Merchant Groups as "Adaptive Units"
(2004) (Paper presented at the Public Choice Society annual meeting, San Diego, California, March 22-
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different cultures, all of them have adapted to the same environment of
underdevelopment of their host countries in the same way. First, they form
tightly-knit homogeneous merchant groups ("HMGs") whose members
cooperate among themselves by providing club goods such as contract
enforcement, access to capital, credit information, etc. Second, the various
HMGs all have social/religious norms that regulate members' behavior, as
well as sanctions for punishing those who violate the norms of the group by
noncooperation, including free riding on the benefits of the HMG. My evi-
dence of HMGs functioning as "adaptive units" provides a very rare and
very important empirical example of a real world phenomenon that sup-
ports the controversial "group selection theory" in the field of evolutionary
biology.
As biologist David Sloan Wilson, who has done a great deal to reha-
bilitate group selection theory, 43 said, referring to a previously published
paper of mine:44
If the Jews in medieval Europe, the Chinese in Southeast Asia, the East
Indians in East Africa, etc. are all alike in some respects based on group-
level adaptation to similar social environments, this is a very important
example of convergent cultural evolution that needs to be showcased to
demonstrate the power of the evolutionary perspective-both theory and
empirical methods-for understanding religious groups in particular and
all human groups in general.
45
V. BOUNDED RATIONALITY OF HOMO CLASSIFICUS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR AN EXPANDED THEORY OF SOCIAL NORMS AS CLASSIFICATION
In a world without transactions costs, institutions would be redundant.
Institutions reduce transaction costs by reducing uncertainty. Institutions
also economize on information costs by providing individuals with a cogni-
tive map that classifies individuals into a few categories under conditions
of limited and costly information. Economic man is a boundedly rational
individual who adapts to his environment, which lacks basic infrastructure,
by forming EHMGs to provide for club goods. Homo classificus also
economizes on information by the use of classfification and recognition
24, 2002; also presented at the annual meeting of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion's
Conference on "Religion, Economics, and Culture" held in Kansas City, Missouri, October, 22-24,
2004). See also examples of homogenous trading groups in Janet T. Landa, Underground Economies:
Generic or Sui Generis?, in BEYOND THE INFORMAL SECTOR: INCLUDING THE EXCLUDED IN
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 75, 80-95 (Jerry Jenkins ed., 1988).
43. For a comprehensive discussion about group selection theory, see ELLIOTT SOBER & DAVID
SLOAN WILSON, UNTO OTHERS: THE EVOLUTION AND PSYCHOLOGY OF UNSELFISH BEHAVIOR (1998).
44. See Landa, supra note 12.
45. David Sloan Wilson, Religious Groups and Homogeneous Merchant Groups as Adaptive
Units: A Multilevel Evolutionary Perspective, 2 J. Bioeconomics 271, 272 (2000).
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fast-and-frugal heuristics. EHMGs thus are adaptive units that outcompete
other ethnic groups in the struggle for scarce economic resources or oppor-
tunities. In the ruthless group competition for scarce resources or economic
opportunities, successful middleman minority groups often become targets
of racial hatred, racial discrimination, racial violence, and interethnic
conflict.
My expanded law and bioeconomics theory of social norms-as-
classification, embedded in EHMGs, can be generalized to all kinds of
situations in which "identity matters," i.e., classification of different kinds
of people into categories. It should provide social scientists with greater
theoretical insights and policy implications when analyzing social phenom-
ena such as minority middleman success in various parts of the world,
changing identities and formation of new identities, racial discrimination,
racial profiling, interethnic conflict, and international terrorism.
